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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE ST A T'E OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
8392

-vs.-

WII.JLIAM FRANCE GILLEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Respondent
ST1\TEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts in substance appellant's preliminary statement as being substantially correct, but
adds the follo·w·ing in order that the Court may conveniently determine the validity of the claim made by
appellant through the prosecution of this appeal.
. According to the record, the district attorney objected a total of three times during the cross-examination
1
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of the witness Samuelson by appellant's counsel. (R. 62,
71.) Of these three objections, not one 'vas sustained .
.._;\_ppellant 's right to face a witness who testifies against
him at the trial, and cross-examine him, was never denied
nor restricted.
To the contrary, the trial court encouraged defense
counsel to proceed in his cross-examination and show
how or 'vhy the witness Samuelson was biased and
prejudiced against the appellant. (R. 71.) The record
makes cl~ar that during the cross-examination of Samuels.on, he had a difficult time understandi~g the questions
and associating them to a particular part of his experience related to the charges which had been filed against
the appellant. It was not unusual for appellant's counsel
to have to ask the questions two, three and four times.
Even after seeing how slow the witness was in comprehending his questions, defense counsel made no effort
to call to his attention the fact that, as counsel, he. believed, if he really did, that the witness Samuelson had
been offered preferential treatment in return for his
testimony.
Prior to the offer of the transcript as evidence (R.
104), ~hich transcript appellant claims would have
impeached the witness, there "\\7 as no attempt made to
discover or disclose by or through cross-examination
whether any leniency or immunity had been received,
promised, offered, expected or hoped for by the witness .
. The only reference made by appellant's counsel to any
such condition was one vague question about the witness
being '' * * * expected to cooperate with the State in
2
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this matter, * *
tion:

*"

during the following cross-examina-

'' Q. At the time of sentencing under that
matter did you have a conversation with the
court~

''A. No. The date I went up for

sentence~

· "Q. That's right.
''A. Yes. I had no conversation at all with
the court that day.

"Q. Pardon

me~

"A. Didn't have no talking with the court at
all that day.
'' Q. Did the court talk to you and admonish
you?
''A. Told me to put it over for a week.

''Q. I mean at the time of your sentencing,
did you have a conversation with the court~
"A. No. I didn't.

''Q. You did not. Maybe I can clear up what
I mean. At the time that you were put on probation, did you have a conversation with the
court~

''A. The day I was put on probation he talked
to me, yes.

''Q. And could you tell me what the court
told you on that day?
"MR. ANDERSON: I think that's immaterial.
''MR. HATCH: I think it is proper to shoto
bias and prejudice, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: On the part of the court or
3
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on the part of the 1oitness? If on- the pa1~t of the
witness, I will let you go ahead.

":11:R. HATCH: On the part of the witness,
Your Honor.
''THE COURT: Go ahead then. Let's see.

'' Q. 'Vhat did the court say to you on that
day'
''A. On that day they told me they was going
to put me on probation, that I had to report back
here to the judge on the 26th of this month.

"Q. And, as a matter of fact, weren't you
told on that day by the court that_ you were expected to cooperate with the state in this matter1
''A. I did not. They did not say nothing to
me.
"MR. HATCH: Thank you. That's all."
(R. 71, 72.) (Emphasis added.)
Defense counsel voluntarily stopped the examination
at this point. The witness was never recalled. There
was no attempt made to lay a foundation for the introduction of the independent evidence appellant now
claims would have impeached the State's witness by
showing his bias or prejudice toward the appellant .
. A.ppellant "ras found guilty of uttering a forged
check, and not of forgery (R. 144). His o"\vn testimony
discloses he had knowledge that the check delivered to
Mr. McDermaid, manager of the 0. P. Skaggs Store,
was forged.
(By Mr. Anderson, District Attorney)
"Q. Well, you said that you saw these checks
4
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being made out I understood in the restaurant" .1~.

That's right.

'' Q. -in Ogden. Is that right?
"A. That's right.

"Q. And you knew that the girl making them
out wasn't a man by the name of G. F. Stevensen,
didn't you'
''A. I did.

"Q. Because you had met Stevensen, hadn't
you?
''A. That's right.

'' Q. And you knew at that time these checks
had come from his store, didn't you~
''A. I didn't know where they came from.
'' Q. Well, you read on them, didn't you 1
''A. I didn't kno'v where they come from
because Samuelson popped them up up there the
first time.

'' Q. Well, you read the title at the top, didn't
you?
"A. Huh'
'' Q. You read the name at the top-

'' Q. You read the name at the top of the
exhibits where it says ''Good Housekeeping Center"'
''A. Yes.
"Q. You did?
''A. Yes.
'' Q. Then you knew where the check had
come from'
5
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''A. Yes.
'' Q. And you knew she was not a man by the
name of G. F. Stevensent

''A. That's right.
'' Q. ~1\_nd so \vhen you were in Skaggs store
and you were asked to endorse this check, you
did so \vithout telling Mr. McDerma.id that fact,
didn't you~ Didn't you 1

''A. Yes. Go ahead.
''Q. And you knew you weren't George Nelson, didn't you¥
"A. Yes sir.

"Q. Now, you said that Mr. Samuelson wa.s
\Vorse off than you, wasn't he?

''A. That's right.
'' Q. So you carried his groceries out to the
car?
''A. No, I didn't carry them.

'' Q. You didn't 1

"A. No.
''Q. What did you take out to the car!
''A. I didn't take nothing only myself.

'' Q. Only yourself¥
"~-\.

Yes. "

(R. 127, 128.)
'' Q. When did you first see the three checks
that you have mentioned?

''A. The first time I seen three checks was at
Ogden, Utah, in the cafeteria.
6
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"Q. Is that the time when this girl - was she
a waitress, was she~

"A . y es, s1r.
.
''Q. Is that the time when she made out the
three checks~''
"A. That's right.

'' Q. Did she make out all three of

them~

"A. Yes sir.

"Q. At that

time~

"A. Yes sir.
'' Q. In your

presence~

"A. I was sitting off to the side eating a
little bite to eat, and Mr. Samuelson had the
checks fixed and folded them up and put them
in his pocket.

'' Q. Then it is your testimony that this girlyou don't know her name~
"A. No, I don't.

'' Q. That she made out those three checks?
''A. Yes.
'' Q. And Exhibits 1 and 2 are two of those
checks~

"A. Well, that is what I figured they are, yes,
because they are both made out looks to me like
the same hand,vriting.
'' Q. So it is your testimony that Exhibits 1
and 2 look like to you the same handwriting~
''A. They certainly do.
'' Q. And they were both made by this girl~
''A. I am pretty sure. There were three
checks made out there." (R. 129, 130.)
7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO PRODUCE CERTAIN INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE WAS NOT ERROR, FOR IT WAS
WITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETION TO SOREFUSE WHEN THERE HAD NOT BEEN A PROPER
FOUNDATION LAID PRIOR TO ITS OFFER.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN INDEPENDENT
EVIDENCE, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO APPEL·LANT'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS FOR APPELLANT'S TESTI1fONY DISCLOSED THAT HE
KNEW THE CHECI{ WAS FORGED, THEREBY
]-,URNISHING THE JURY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO FIND APPELLANT
GUILTY OF UTTERING A FORGED INSTRUMENT .
.A.RGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO PRODUCE CERTAIN INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE vV AS NOT ERROR, FOR IT WAS
WITHIN ~CI-IE COURT'S DISCRETION TO SOREFUSE WHEN THER.E HAD NOT BEEN A PROPER
FOUNDATION L~L\.ID PRIOR TO ITS OFFER.
There is no question that the cases cited in appellant's brief speak the la\v as it has been established.
However, respondent feels that the cases cited therein
8
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are not in point and can be distinguished from the issue
presented by this appeal.
It is admitted that the testimony of an accomplice
must be received with caution and be subject to grave
suspicion. Ho,vever, this kind of testimony is often the
only evidence the State can produce in criminal matters.
As a result, it is generally considered to be competent,
and if, after all the facts and circumstances in evidence
are considered, such testimony is sufficient to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury is authorized
to find a verdict of guilty. If this rule were any different,
many criminals "'ould go unpunished. State v. Harding,
161 Wash. 379, 297 P. 167; People v. Kendall, 357 Ill.
448, 192 N.E. 378. The general rule is broad enough to
include the testimony of an accomplice even though
uncorroborated. People v. Kendall, supra; People v.
Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539.
But the rule has been changed in Utah by statute.
Our law requires that the testimony of an accomplice
be corroborated by evidence "* * * which in itself and
without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends
to connect the defendant with the commission of the
offense * * *. '' ( 77-31-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.)
In order to determine if the corroborative evidence is
sufficient in and of itself to tend to implicate and connect the accused "'ith the commission of the offense
charged, the testimony of the accomplice should be disregarded; then, if the other testimony and evidence
properly admitted tends to prove the connection of the
accused with the crime, it is sufficient. It need not be
9
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sufficient to sustain a conviction by itself, but it must
terid to implicate the accused with the c.rime charged
and not be consistent with his innocence. State v. Clark,
3 U. 2d 382, 284 P. 2d 700.
At appellant's trial, the accomplice, Samuelson,
testified to certain facts which were corroborated by
other evidence. There can be little doubt that his testimony vvas corroborated by that of the other witnesses
on the following facts:
1. Samuelson took the checks-no dispute
testimony of Samuelson and appellant. (R. 57.)

111

the

2. The checks were apparently made out by the
appellant. (R. 57, 60, 67, 90.)
3. Appellant did not have authority to make out
the checks. (R. 36, 58.)
4. Appellant aided in passing the forged check and
thereby declaring and asserting, directly or indirectly,
by his re-endorsement that the instrument was good. (R.
48, 66, 114, 127' 128.)
5. Appellant received the change (money) given
for the forged check cashed at the 0. P. Skaggs Store.
(R. 55, 64.)
Appellant's brief stresses the right of a defendant,
in a criminal action, to confront an individual who is a
witness for the State· and to cross-examine him during
the proceedings. And, it is contended that this is
especial~y true when the witness was an accomplice of
the defendant in the commission of the offense he is
10
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charged with. This rule of law has been settled in Utah.
There is no question but that the defendant in a criminal
proceeding has an absolute right and not only a mere
privilege to cross-examine such a witness. State v. Zola;ntakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044; Sta.te v. Ba,rretta, 47
Utah 479, 155 P. 343.
Respondent· further accepts the principals of law
that require the jury to see and have a chance to study
the demeanor of the witness during cross-examination
in order to evaluate the truth or falsity of his testimony;
that a witness may be cross--examined as to whether or
not he received any consideration for his testimony;
that it is error to refuse such cross-examination even
though the witness has only a hope of leniency; that
the witness may be cross-examined as to what reward
has been already received and the facts surrounding the
award of leniency or immunity.
Though this is the law, it is difficult to see what
application it has to the issue presented by this appeal.
It has no bearing upon the introduction of the independent evidence which it is claimed would have impeached
a particular witness, for the right of cross-examination
was never refused the appellant during his trial.
The question of whether any leniency or immunity
has been afforded an accomplice in return for his testimony at the trial of his associates is always subject to a
probing, sifting cross-examination. However, under the
rules of our courts and because of the very nature of
the proceedings in the courts, being adversary against
adversary, it is the duty of the defense counsel to pro11
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ceed and extend the examination into the areas he believes will best benefit his client. It is not incumbent
upon a court to make sure the attorneys that appear
before it perform one hundred per cent in the application of every rule of law within its knowledge and understanding.
The point of respondent's argument is simply thisduring the trial, appellant's counsel didn't take advantage of his right to cross-examine the witness as to what
leniency or immunity he may have received, been promised, expected or hoped for.
After the trial court had given its express permission to appellant's counsel to proceed in his attempt to
disclose the bias and prejudice claimed to be tainting
the witness's testimony, counsel stopped after one vague
question about the court expecting the witness "* * * to
cooperate with the State in this matter~" No attempt
was made to associate the remark supposedly made at
the time the court sentenced the witness with the present
proceeding in that the witness was to receive preferential
treatment. Again it is pointed out that defense counsel
voluntarily stopped his examination at this point and
appellant 'vas never restricted in his right to crossexamine the "\vitness Samuelson.
As stated in Point I of appellant's brief, the real
issu~ to be considered by this appeal is whether it was
error to refuse the introduction of certain evidence for
impeachment of the \Yitness Samuelson. A party is not
permitted to impeach the credibility of a witness against
him by the introduction of independent evidence \vhich

12
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it is claimed shows an inconsistent statement, hostility,
prejudice, or interest in the outcome of the case without
first laying a foundation for the introduction of said
evidence. The foundation is laid by calling the attention
of the witness to the statement or act which it is claimed
'viii show his bias, prejudice, hostility or interest, thus
giving him an opportunity to admit, deny or explain it.
State u. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P. 2d 727; Faga.n v.
Lentz, 156 Cal. 181, 105 P. 951, 20 Ann. Cas. 221 ; see also
16 A.L.R. 984.
It is not sufficient merely to ask the witness during
cross-examination whether certain statements were made
by him or made in his presence. It is necessary in order
to lay a sufficient foundation on which to show that a
'vitness is hostile or biased to directly question him as
to the precise statements or happenings to be used
against him and the place where they were alleged to
have been made. Wright v. State, 153 Ark. 16, 201 S.W.
1107; State v. Ellsworth, 30 Ore. 145, 47 P. 199; State v.
McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 261 P. 2d 663; Willis v. State,
25·7 Ala. 500, 66 So. 2d 753; McCauley v. Sta.te, 64 Ga.
App. 509, 71 S.E. 2d 664; People v. Adair, 120 C.A. 2d
765, 228 P. 2d 336; Galvarn v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 349,
86 s.w. 2d 228.
There was no attempt made during the cross-examination of Samuelson to disclose whether any leniency
or immunity had been offered, accepted, or hoped for, on
the part of the witness, nor was it shown that the court's
comments at the time Samuelson was sentenced had any
effect upon him whatever. Samuelson was not asked
13
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if he felt that his testimony, given at appellant's trial,
was to be the basis upon which he expected to receive
probation.
A careful reading of the cases cited by appellant
in his brief (excluding the last four) discloses that in
each instance the right of cross-examination that was
refused, resulted either after a question pointed specifically at immunity or leniency received, promised, expected or hoped for, or after an offer of proof directed
at disclosing the same.
The case of State v. Barretta, supra, a Utah case,
is an excellent example. Barretta, an accomplice, was
asked on cross-examination:
''Don't you understand that your case is to be
dismissed if you will testify against the defendants * * * in this case~''
In the Barretta case, as in most of the cases cited by
appellant, the problem of the introduction of independent
evidence to impeach a particular witness was not involved. On appeal, in each case, the issue involved the
refusal of the trial court of permission to cross-examine
one of the state's witnesses about his bias, prejudice,
hostility or interest in the outcome of the case. Also,
· the trial court in some of the cases denied the right to
cross-examine a \vitness concerning immunity or leniency
and the fact that, though the witness was an accomplice,
the charge filed against him had not been prosecuted or
had been dismissed in return for his testimony and help
in obtaining a conviction of his associates.

14
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Consideration should also be given to the fact that
the disclosure of bias, prejudice or hostility in a witness
does not exclude his testimony but rather goes only to
the credibility of the witness. The witness Samuelson
was labled an accomplice at the very outset of the trial
and by his own testimony given a little later. Therefore,
the jury had an opportunity to judge his credibility.
People v. Simard, 314 Mich. 62.4, 23 N.W. 2d 106. His
credibility was also placed before the jury to be tested
and studied when on cross-examination it was disclosed
that he had a criminal record and had been convicted of
a felony in Idaho (R. 60).
Where counsel seeks to discredit a witness by showing bias, hostility, prejudice or interest, he should first
inquire as to the state of the witness' feelings toward
the person involved. Carlyle v. State, 85 Ga. App. 223,
68 S.E. 2d 605. In proving hostility and bias in a witness,
facts which directly tend to establish it should be resorted
to, such as threats, quarrels and like circumstances. It is
also sufficient to show the hostility by reasonable inference from the circumstances inquired about. State v.
Belansky, 3 1\tiinn. 246, Gil. 169.
After all, impeachment is not a central matter and
the trial judge, though he may not deny a reasonable
opportunity at any stage to prove the bias of a witness,
has discretion to control the extent to which the proof
may go.
The writers of texts and encyclopedias list many
cases to prove that the evidence to explain bias or
hostility, or to explain it away, is or is not admissible.
15
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But what these cases really stand for, "Then they arp
sufficiently well reasoned to reveal their rationale, is
that the admission or rejection of such evidence lies in
the discretion of the trial judge. Lau Fook Kan v. United
States, 9th Cir., 34 Fed. 86, 91; People v. Zugouras, 163
N.Y. 250, 57 N.E. 465; Priori v. United Sta.tes, 6th Cir.,
6 F. 2d 575; Commonwealth v. Ezell, 212 Pa. 293, 61 A.
930; State v. Long, 95 Vt. 485, 115 A. 734; State v. Frazer,
23 S.D. 804, 121 N.W. 790; Bracey v. United States, 142
F. 2d 85.
The trial judge has the responsibility of seeing the
sideshow does not take over the circus. In fact, the
situation of the present case provides a good example
for the necessity for permitting the trial judge to exercise considerable discretion in admitting or rejecting
evidence. He observed the conduct of counsel, the reactions of the witnesses under examination, both direct
and cross, and the resulting affect upon the jury. In
other words, he was aware as no appellate court can be,
of the courtroom psychology and, hence, is in a position
to determine whether particular testimony should or
should not be received. Appellate courts have been
especially unwilling to override the exercise of discretion of trial judges in such circumstances. Williamson v.
United States, 207 U.S. 425, 28 S.Ct. 163, 52 L.Ed. 278;
Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150, 13 S.Ct. 288, 37 L.Ed.
278.

By exercising its discretion to exclude the proffered
evidence, the court indica ted that, in its considered judgment, the appellant would be best served. The judge felt

16
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that such evidence '' ... would have no bearing here and
would greatly tend to prejudice this jury. If the jury
thought the court at one time had an opinion, I think
it would be highly prejudicial.'' (R. 104.)
Consideration should also be given to the procedural
effect the introduction of the independent evidence
·would have had upon the court. To rehabilitate the witness Samuelson, it would have been necessary to call the
judge there presiding as a witness. Though the statutes
of this State allow such (78-24-3, U.C.A. 1953), the general view is that expressed in the California case of
People v. Connors, 77 Cal. App. 438, 246 P. 1072, 157
A.L.R. 322. That court, in discussing the statute that
allowed a trial judge to be called as a witness at a hearing over which he was presiding, indicated such was
within his discretion, that such discretion should never
be resorted to, and that a trial judge should not become
a witness except in cases where the circumstances imperatively require it. It should be noted that the California and Utah statutes use the same language.
As a general proposition, it may be said that the
weight of authority sustains the view that a presiding
judge may not temporarily leave the bench and become
a witness in a case being heard by him. The recent decisions agree that such conduct is improper, although
there may be a question of whether or not it constitutes
prejudicial error. Testimony of Judge or Juror, 1945
Wis. Law Review, p. 248.
In some cases, the courts have held that where the
judge, called to the witness stand, is trying the case and
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his continuance is necessary to a proper trial thereof,
it is error for him to testify. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y.
374, 11 Am. Rep. 349; State v. Sandquist, 46 Minn. 322,
178 N.W. 883.
This rule has been amplified and it has been considered a fatal error for the presiding judge to testify
in a criminal case. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; People v. McDermott, 40
N.Y.S. 2d 456; State v. Bagwell, 201 S.C. 387, 23 S.E. 2d
244; Downey v. [T nited States, 91 F. 2d 223.
In the present case the question of the witness's
credibility and veracity had been placed before the jury.
It was shown that the witness was an accomplice in the
crime; therefore, the jury had a chance to judge his
credibility. People v. Simard, supra. Also, the jury had
a second chance to consider the veracity of Samuelson
when it was shown that he had a criminal record. If the
independent evidence offered by the appellant had been
received, it would have diverted the attention of the jury
to a col]ateral issue, for which there was no foundation
upon which to judge the character of evidence introduced.
''Where the effect, even if not the intent, of
the evidence offered is to divert the attention of
the jury by a collateral and subordinate issue, the
matter must always be left largely in the discretion of the judge, and in this case it certainly was
not abused, as it is clear that there was no solid
foundation for the charge of hostile bias on the
part of the \vitness, .whose testimony in the main
points" * * * [\Vas corroborated by that of the
other witnesses.]
18
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Commonwealth v. Ezell, supra.
Cross-examination and the introduction of independent evidence 'vith respect to appropriate subject of
inquiry rests in the discretion of the trial court; and it
is only in cases of clear abuse of such discretion, resulting in manifest prejudice to the complaining party,
that the reviewing court will interfere. lgo v. State,. -----Okla. ______ , 267 P. 2d 1082.

POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN INDEPENDENT
EVIDENCE, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO APPELLANT'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS FOR APPELLANT'S TESTIJ\IIONY DISCLOSED THAT HE
KNEW THE CHECK WAS FORGED, THEREBY
FURNISHING THE JURY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO FIND APPELLANT
GUILTY OF UTTERING A FORGED INSTRUMENT.
Section 76-26-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines
uttering in the following language :
''Every person who * * * utters, publishes or
passes, or attempts to pass, as true or genuine
any * * * fake, altered, forged or counterfeited
matters, * * * knowing the same to be false 'X< * *
with the intent to prejudice, damage or defraud
any person * * * is guilty of forgery."
It seems reasonable to say that the inference, that
a person who utters as genuine a forged instrument had
knowledge of its forged condition, is particularly warranted where, in addition to his possession and uttering
19
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of the forged instrument, there are accompanying circumstances 'Yhich are indicative of such knowledge on
his part, such as, for example, his being named as payee
or falsely representing himself as the payee or the endorsee, or making other false representations when
uttering it. (164 A.L.R. 621.) When a person aids in
passing a forged instrument, he thereby declares and
asserts, directly and indirectly, that the instrument is
good. When the forged instrument is uttered, the intent
to defraud is presumed, Spears v. People, 220 Ill. 72, 77
N.E. 112, and where a person is actually defrauded, the
intent to defraud ordinarily becomes conclusive. And,
it has been held that one's intent is prima facie criminal
where, in cashing a check, he falsely permitted himself
to be identified as being the payee, and forged the endorsement of the payee on said check. State v. Vineyard,
16 l\{ont. 138, 40 P. 173.
In that case, the court said :
"If a man goes to a stranger with a check
made out to another, permits himself to be identified as the real payee, and secures the amount
of the check as an accommodation, after making
a fictitious or forged endorsement thereon, we
unhesitatingly say that his intent is prima facie
criminal and to hold otherwise, under the facts
of this case, is contrary to all logical processes
of reasoning * * *. ''
Can there be any doubt about whether appellant
knew the check ":as forged'~ Of course not. His claim
of innocent involvement is not worth considering. This
man was no innocent bystander. On cross-examination
the fact that appellant had served time in both the Ore20
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gon and Idaho state penitentiaries for forgery was
brought out for the jury to consider (R. 119, 120.) After
four different convictions, he certainly must have realized
and have been fully aware of the criminal nature of the
act of passing the check by a fictitious or forged endorsement or reendorsement.
''Evidence of similar forgeries is admissable
to show a uniform course of acting from which
guilty knowledge and criminal intent can be inferred. In other words, the evidence of other
forgeries is admissable not to prove the commission of the crime for which the party is being
tried, but to prove guilty knowledge and Intent * * *."

State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P. 2d 750.
Though the above stated rule is sometimes qualified by
the time lapse between each act of forging or passing a
forged instrument, it would appear to have application
in this case.
By his own testimony, the appellant convicted himself. He admits that he knew the checks were not issued
by the proprietor of the Good Housekeeping Center, nor
\Vas the authority to make the checks given to anyone
else, to his knowledge. (R. 126, 127, 128, 129, 130.) His
story involves a waitress whom, he claims, made out the
checks. (R. 110, 111.) However, he readily admits she
couldn't have had the authorization of Mr. G. F. Stevensen, owner of ''Good Housekeeping Center'' to so
do, nor was she G. F. Stevensen.
Appellant represented to the manager of the store
\vhere the check was cashed, that he was George Nelson,
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the payee named on the check, and at the request of the
manager re-endorsed the check (R. 48). After the check
had been cashed, appellant received the change therefrom. This is sufficient to show the intent to defraud
and the actual defrauding of an individual.
Throughout the record, the fact is brought out that
the appellant and his associate had been drinking
heavily. This is of no consequence for: ''No act committed while in a. state of voluntary intoxication is less
criminal by reason of his having been in such conditon.''
(76-1-22, U.C.A. 1953.)
One last comment should be made concerning the
full effect of the testimony given by Samuelson. There
was not one material statement made that was not substantiated by the other witnesses. The only force his
testimony could lend to the prosecution was to prove
the actual forging of the checks, and even this was testified to by the expert who testified on behalf of the State.
Appellant \Vas not convicted of forgery, but of
uttering a forged instrument; and, as shown above, the
evidence produced by the State and the testimony of
the appellant gave the jury all the evidence, and, in
considering it, the jury could not have found other than
it did.
CONCLUSION
The· judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
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.._"1ssistant Attorney General
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